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LUSTER V. STATE AND STARKEY V. OKLAHOMA: MODERN
SCARLET LETTER REGULATIONS AND THE COURTS' COLD
SHOULDER
ABSTRACT
Sex offenders face a unique set of consequences that extend beyond
their pronounced sentence. These consequences carry heavy social im-
plications and inflict public humiliation. The malleability of sex offender
registration laws, and the legislature's ability to extend the consequences
as it sees fit, creates a difficult and potentially unfair situation for past
offenders. The Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution
does not allow retroactive punishment. However, this only applies to
punitive law. The Supreme Court has provided a test, often called the
"intent-effect" test, to determine if retroactive consequences are punitive.
In Luster v. State ex rel. Department of Corrections and Starkey v. Okla-
homa Department of Corrections, the Oklahoma Supreme Court ana-
lyzed the punitive intent and effect of Oklahoma's retroactive registra-
tion laws and concluded that the laws were in violation of the Ex Post
Facto Clause. No other state in the Tenth Circuit has yet provided an
adequate analysis of the punitive effect of its registration requirements.
This Comment argues that the Tenth Circuit states should follow the
Oklahoma Supreme Court's example by carefully examining the punitive
effect of each state's respective sex offender registration requirements.
Luster and Starkey have shown that these laws may be unconstitutional.
The rule of law under the Constitution favors predictability, and if legis-
latures are allowed to retroactively change the registration requirements,
offenders will be kept in lifelong fear that their sentence may be extend-
ed at any time on the whim of the legislature. Therefore, each state court
must be vigilant to ensure that the punitive effect of its laws is not exces-
sive in relation to the nonpunitive intent of its legislature.
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INTRODUCTION
Everyone makes mistakes. Each mistake comes with consequences.
Craig Reynolds, a Texas resident, has learned that some mistakes lead to
unrelenting consequences.' Reynolds was convicted of a sex crime in
1990, before Texas had a requirement for sex offender registration.2 One
year later, Texas passed S.B. No. 259 establishing a registration require-
ment and consequences for failing to apply. This amendment only ap-
plied to those convicted after September 1991.4 Just six years later, after
Reynolds had already served his five-year sentence, Texas enacted S.B.
875 requiring all sexual offenders convicted after 1970 to register if they
were incarcerated or under supervision at the time the amendment was
1. Emily DePrang, Criminal Court Punts on 'Retroactive Punishment' Question, TEX.
OBSERVER (Mar. 31, 2014, 12:59 PM), http://www.texasobserver.org/texas-court-criminal-appeals-
retroactive-civil-penalties.
2. Id.
3. Sexual Offender Registration Program, S. 259, 72d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1991).
4. Id.
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passed.5 Reynolds narrowly escaped this statute as he was no longer in-
carcerated, on probation, or on parole.6 The striking blow, however,
came in 2005 in the form of H.B. No. 867 requiring all sex offenders
convicted after 1970, regardless of incarceration or supervision, to apply
for sex offender registration.7 Reynolds had been a free man for a dec-
ade, lived a clean life, and now he would be required to apply for public
registration and endure its accompanying humiliation.8 Is it fair to keep
sex offenders, like Reynolds, in fear that the legislature may increase
their registration requirements as it sees fit?
The United States Constitution explicitly prohibits ex post facto
laws.9 An ex post facto law is "one which imposes a punishment for an
act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes
additional punishment to that then prescribed."o At first glance, it would
seem that an amendment like that affecting Reynolds would clearly be
retroactive and in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. However, "it has
long been recognized . . . that the constitutional prohibition on ex post
facto laws applies only to penal statutes ..... "" The question then is
what can properly be considered a penal law? The majority of courts,
when hearing the issue of sex offender registration amendments and their
retroactive application, have held the laws are civil and nonpunitive.12
However, after Smith v. Doe,'3 a recent landmark Supreme Court case
addressing this question, many courts have held sex offender registration
laws invalid as punitive and in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.14
This Comment examines the Tenth Circuit states' varying interpretations
of this question. Nearly all of the Tenth Circuit states have found the law
to be nonpunitive; however, Oklahoma did the most thorough analysis
and held that the law did have a punitive effect. Following Oklahoma's
lead, this Comment argues that each state's offenders should only be held
to the registration requirements in effect at the time he or she pled or was
found guilty.
5. Sex Offender Registration Program, TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 62.02(d), amended by S.
875, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997); DePrang, supra note 1.
6. DePrang, supra note 1.
7. Sex Offender Registration Requirements, TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 62.002(a), enacted by
H. 867, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005); DePrang supra note 1.
8. Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880,
1913 (1991) (explaining the shaming techniques used to punish offenders in the late 1600s includ-
ing: forcing the accused to wear degrading signs, forcing the accused to confess in public, or brand-
ing the accused as permanent labeling); DePrang, supra note 1.
9. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
10. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 325-26 (1866).
11. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1990).
12. See William M. Howard, Annotation, Validity of State Sex Offender Registration Laws
Under Ex Post Facto Prohibitions, 63 A.L.R. 6th 351 (2011).
13. 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
14. Howard, supra note 12, §§ 3-4; see also Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (describing the proper
analysis to determine if a law is civil and nonpunitive, or punitive either in intent or effect).
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Part I of this Comment provides a summary of the U.S. Supreme
Court's ex post facto analysis of sex offender registration statutes. It then
explains how the various state courts in the Tenth Circuit have applied
this analysis and come to varying conclusions. Part II explores the analy-
sis of two recent Oklahoma Supreme Court cases: Starkey v. Oklahoma
Department of Corrections15 and Luster v. State ex rel. Department of
Corrections. This Part shows how the Oklahoma Supreme Court ap-
plied the same test from Smith but came to a different conclusion. Part III
describes the failure of the Tenth Circuit states to give a consistent and
reliable answer to past sex offenders seeking relief This part also shows
the various consequences of sex offender registration in each state. Since
law should be predictable,17 Part III concludes by providing an argument
for what the Tenth Circuit states should do to avoid the injustice of leav-
ing offenders in fear of the legislature increasing their sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
To clarify the reason for the courts' confusion as to the punitive na-
ture of sex offender registration laws, Subpart A will summarize the
analysis given in the landmark Supreme Court case Smith v. Doe. Sub-
parts B through E will give a detailed description of the subsequent con-
fusion put upon the state courts in applying the proper test. Specifically,
these Subparts will address Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyo-
ming's varying interpretations and applications of the Smith case. Kansas
has not yet addressed this question in any published opinion.'8
A. Smith v. Doe: Determining Punitive Intent and Effect
In 1994, Megan Kanka, a seven-year-old girl in New Jersey, was
assaulted and murdered by her neighbor, Jesse Timmedequas.'9 Un-
known to the family, the neighbor had been previously convicted of sex
crimes against children.2 0 Megan's parents explained that if they had
known their neighbor was a sex offender, their daughter would not have
died.2 1 This event stirred politicians and public activists to support "a
change in the laws that [previously] allowed sex offenders and child mo-
lesters to live in secrecy amongst their potential victims."22 In 1994, New
15. 305 P.3d 1004 (Okla. 2013).
16. 315 P.3d 386 (Okla. 2013).
17. EDWIN SCOTT FRUEHWALD, CHOICE OF LAW FOR AMERICAN COURTS: A
MULTILATERALIST METHOD 52 (2001) (explaining that "any choice of law system should be as
predictable as possible" so that citizens "know how the law governs their behavior so that they can
conform their behavior to the law").
18. See State v. Donaldson, 331 P.3d 833 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished
table decision).
19. Mary K. Evans, Megan's Law: Citizens' Perceptions of Sex Offender Community Notifi-
cation in Nebraska 5-7 (Aug., 2007) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Graduate College of the University
of Nebraska) (on file with the University of Nebraska Library system).
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Jersey passed a law, nicknamed "Megan's Law," meant to inform the
public about the presence of convicted sex offenders.23 By 1996, every
state had enacted its own version of Megan's Law, creating several dif-
ferent registration programs across the nation.24 Alaska's version, the
Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (the Act), was the Supreme
Court's main concern in the Smith case.
Smith involved two anonymous respondents (Doe I and Doe 11).25
Doe I and Doe II were both convicted of sexual abuse of a minor.26 After
being released from prison in 1990, they entered rehabilitative programs,
which they both completed.27 Aggravated sex offenders in Alaska, such
as the respondents in Smith, were required to register for life under Alas-
ka Statute 12.63.010.28 Even though the statute was passed after Doe I
and Doe II were convicted, it applied to them both retroactively.29 The
parties brought this action seeking for the Act to be held void under the
Ex Post Facto Clause.30
The Supreme Court separated its analysis into two parts: (1) to "as-
certain whether the legislature meant the statute to establish 'civil' pro-
ceedings," and if so (2) to "examine whether the statutory scheme is 'so
punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention' to
deem it 'civil."' 31 If the Court had found that the legislature meant the
statute to be punitive, there would be no need for further analysis.3 2 The
Court "ordinarily defer[s] to the legislature's stated intent,"33 and "'only
the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform
what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty."
34
The Court easily determined that the legislature intended the Act to
be nonpunitive by reading directly from its language: "'[S]ex offenders
pose a high risk of reoffending,' and . . . 'protecting the public from sex
offenders' [is] the 'primary governmental interest' 35 Likewise, the Court
explained that "[n]othing on the face of the statute suggests that the legis-
lature sought to create anything other than a civil . . . scheme designed to
23. Id.
24. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 90 (2003).
25. Id. at 91.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.010(d)(2) (2008), invalidated as applied by Doe v. State, 189 P.3d
999 (Alaska 2008).
29. Smith, 538 U.S. at 91.
30. Id. at 91-92.
31. Id. at 92 (alteration in original) (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
32. Id.
33. Id. (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361) (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. Id. (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 (1997)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
35. Id. at 93 (quoting Act of May 12, 1994, 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 41, §§ 1(l)-(2)).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
protect the public from harm."36 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majori-
ty, struggled to show how the statute was meant to be nonpunitive when
it accomplished the same goals as Alaska's criminal law, and it was par-
tially codified within Alaska's criminal procedure.3  With the issue hasti-
ly disposed of, the Court quickly moved on from the legislature's intent
to the actual punitive effect of the statute.3 8
The Court analyzed the punitive effect of the Alaska statute using
seven factors established in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.39 These fac-
tors include:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation
will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and de-
terrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connect-
ed is assignable for it, [and] whether it appears excessive in relation
to the alternative purpose assigned .... 40
Justice Kennedy started by explaining that registration is "of fairly
recent origin," and thus cannot have historically or traditionally been
regarded as punishment.41 Even so, Justice Kennedy again struggled to
clearly separate the consequences of online public disclosure from the
public shaming historically cast upon those committing the same sexual
crimes.42 Next, Justice Kennedy refused to accept the Ninth Circuit's
logical argument that offender registration created an affirmative disabil-
ity and restraint both in employment and housing.4 3 Justice Kennedy
conceded that the court of appeal's argument had force, but he argued
that offenders are "free to move where they wish and to live and work as
other citizens."4" A closer look at housing and employment consequences
in more recent times suggests this statement from 2003 may no longer be
accurate.45
36. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 95.
39. Id. at 97; Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
40. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted).
41. Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 (quoting Doe v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979, 989 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd sub
nom. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
42. Id. at 97-99 (describing registration online as simply an easier way to search criminal
history, and humorously adding that the "[w]eb site does not provide the public with means to shame
the offender by, say, posting comments undemeath his record").
43. Id. at 100.
44. Id. at 101.
45. See infra Part III.A (discussing housing and employment issues arising from offender
registration).
618 [Vol. 92:3
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The Court continued by admitting that offender registration deters
future crime, which is a purpose of punishment.4 6 However, Justice Ken-
nedy felt that labeling a law as criminal just because it shared a similar
purpose with criminal law-deterrence-would "undermine the Gov-
ernment's ability to engage in effective regulation."4 7 The Court quickly
transitioned into explaining that the court of appeals was wrong to say
the Act's obligations were retributive.48 The Ninth Circuit argued that the
Act imposed a requirement based on "the extent of the wrongdoing, not
by the extent of the risk posed."49 However, Justice Kennedy rejected
this reasoning, explaining that the length of reporting requirements was
"reasonably related to the danger of recidivism" and therefore consistent
with the regulatory and nonpunitive goals.50 It seems that Justice Kenne-
dy focused on the intent of the Act's requirements while avoiding the
question of whether the effect of the registration requirements fulfilled
retributive goals.
The Court considered the registration requirements' connection to a
nonpunitive purpose to be one of the most significant factors.5' It con-
cluded that the registration served the purpose of public safety, and the
court of appeals readily agreed.52 The court of appeals alternatively ar-
gued that the requirement was overly broad because it applies "to all
convicted sex offenders without regard to their future dangerousness."
However, Justice Kennedy felt this was unpersuasive in that sex offend-
ers are dangerous "as a class."54 The Court then explained that the dan-
gers of recidivism justified the length of the reporting requirement, mak-
ing it not excessive in relation to the nonpunitive goal of public safety.55
Justice Souter, in a concurring opinion, writes that for him "this is a
close case, for I not only agree with the Court that there is evidence
pointing to an intended civil characterization of the Act, but also see con-
siderable evidence pointing the other way." 56 Justice Souter conceded
that public safety should be given serious weight in the analysis, but then
stated, "[I]t would be naive to look no further, given pervasive attitudes
toward sex offenders."5  He goes on to explain how widespread dissemi-
nation of offenders' names humiliates and ostracizes offenders and
46. Smith, 538 U.S. at 102.
47. Id. (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 105 (1997)) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
48. Id.
49. Id. (quoting Doe v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979, 990 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'dsub nom. Smith v. Doe,
538 U.S. 84) (internal quotation mark omitted).
50. Id.
51. Id
52. Id. at 103.
53. Id. (citing Doe v. Otte, 259 F.3d at 991-92, rev'd sub nom., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84).
54. Id
55. Id
56. Id. at 107 (Souter, J., concurring).
57. Id at 108-09.
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"bears some resemblance to shaming punishments that were used earlier
in our history." 8 He finally concludes, "What tips the scale for me is the
presumption of constitutionality normally accorded a State's law."59
Lastly, Justice Stevens in a strong dissent states, "No matter how often
the Court may repeat and manipulate multifactor tests . . . it will never
persuade me that the registration and reporting obligations that are im-
posed on convicted sex offenders and no one else as a result of their con-
victions are not part of their punishment."60
Importantly, the Smith case only applied specifically to Alaska's
registration requirement. Therefore, state supreme courts were given
discretion to apply the Court's standards to their respective state registra-
tion statutes. Many states took this opportunity to discontinue the retro-
active application of sex offender registrations in their jurisdiction.6 1
B. Colorado's Interpretation
Colorado's reaction to challenges of sex offender registration laws
can be summarized with four seminal cases: Jamison v. People,6 2 People
v. Tuffo,63 People v. Sowell,6 and People v. Durapau.65 These cases are
all from the Colorado Court of Appeals; the Colorado Supreme Court has
not yet taken the opportunity to clarify the issue. These cases show that
Colorado, like the United States Supreme- Court, has based its decisions
66on fear of recidivism rather than what would be just and fair. In fact,
studies have shown that sexual criminals tend to have the lowest recidi-
vism rates amongst other criminals.67 Still, stories like Megan Kanka's
cause lawmakers to fear dangerous recidivists. While reading these sub-
58. Id. at 109.
59. Id. at I10.
60. Id. at 113 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. See Howard, supra note 12, § 4 (citing cases that have held offender registrations invalid
under ex post facto analyses).
62. 988 P.2d 177 (Colo. App. 1999).
63. 209 P.3d 1226 (Colo. App. 2009).
64. 327 P.3d 273 (Colo. App. 2011).
65. 280 P.3d 42 (Colo. App. 2011).
66. See Kelsey Eagan, Casenote, Forfeiting Sex Offenders' Constitutional Rights Due to the
Stigma of Their Crimes?: State v. Trosclair, 59 LOY. L. REV. 267, 267 (2013) (explaining how social
stigma and fear of recidivism have caused the courts to turn a blind eye to offenders' constitutional
rights).
67. See Johnna Preble, The Shame Game: Montana s Right to Privacy for Level I Sex Offend-
ers, 75 MONT. L. REV. 297, 308-09 (2014) ("[S]ex offenders really do not recidivate more than
other types of criminals. In 2002, researchers Langan and Levin found that within a three-year peri-
od recidivism rates were as follows: burglary, 76%; robbery, 70.2%; drug offenses, 66.7%; and rape,
46%." (footnote omitted)); see also Stephanie N.K. Robbins, Comment, Homelessness Among Sex
Offenders: A Case for Restricted Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 20 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 205, 216 (2010) ("Sex offender registration and notification laws are based on the
faulty assumption that sex offenders are more likely to recidivate than other offenders."). But see
Roger Przybylski, Chapter 5: Adult Sex Offender Recidivism, OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS,
http://www.smart.gov/SOMAPI/sec I /ch5_recidivism.html#top (last visited Jan. 31, 2015) (acknowl-
edging that many sex offenses go underreported).
620 [Vol. 92:3
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parts, it is helpful to consider whether all criminals should have to regis-
ter.
In Jamison, Mark Jamison had been convicted of sexual assault and
sentenced to twenty-five years in 1988, six years before Colorado's Me-
gan's Law became effective.68 In 1994, C.R.S. § 18-3-412.5(1) was
passed, requiring all convicted sex offenders released after 1991 to regis-
ter with local law enforcement.69 The Colorado Court of Appeals con-
cluded that "the intent of the statute is remedial and not punitive."o The
court did not consider whether the effect of the statute is in any way pu-
nitive.7 ' In fact, the court merely concluded, with no supporting evi-
dence, that the statute "does not disadvantage [the] plaintiff." 72 Being
that his twenty-five years would have been fulfilled in 2013, Mr. Jamison
is certainly disadvantaged now.73 However, the court analyzed the consti-
tutionality of a potentially ex post facto law merely by guessing at the
legislature's implied intent.
Around a decade later, the court came out with its decision in Tuffo.
Jason Tuffo pled guilty to a misdemeanor sexual assault, and if the court
were to consider him a sexually violent predator, he would have had to
register for life.74 The court again simply concluded, with no analysis,
that the law in no way disadvantaged Mr. Tuffo after the fact.75 The court
stated, "the registration and notification requirements established in the
SVP statute are intended to protect the community rather than punish the
offender."76 Once again, the court remained silent as to the actual puni-
tive, retroactive effect of these laws.
Two years later, the Colorado Court of Appeals heard People v.
Sowell. Monty Sowell pled guilty to sexual assault on a child by one in a
position of trust.77 The plea agreement contained nothing regarding regis-
tration, and offenders were allowed at the time to "petition after a wait-
ing period to discontinue the [registration] requirement." Mr. Sowell
did his time on probation, registered as a sex offender, and then peti-
tioned in 2009 to discontinue registration.7 9 Unfortunately, in 2001 (two
years after he was completely released from supervision), the General
Assembly changed the statute precluding these petitions and requiring
68. Jamison v. People, 988 P.2d 177, 179 (Colo. App. 1999).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 180.
71. See id. at 179.
72. Id. at 180.
73. Id.; see discussion infra Part lI1.A regarding the negative consequences of sex offender
registration on employment and housing.
74. People v. Tuffo, 209 P.3d 1226, 1228 (Colo. App. 2009).
75. Id. at 1230.
76. Id.
77. People v. Sowell, 327 P.3d 273, 274 (Colo. App. 2011).
78. Id.
79. Id.
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Sowell to register for life.8 0 This statute was applied to Sowell retroac-
tively, and as such, was at least potentially in violation of the Ex Post
Facto Clause. Even so, eight years after the Supreme Court released its
holding in Smith, the court of appeals still made no findings regarding
the punitive effects of the registration statute. In fact, this court simply
stated that the statute was constitutional under the holdings of Jamison
and Tuffo, cases decided with no reference to the Supreme Court's analy-
*81
sis. 8
Finally, the most recent Colorado case to address retroactive regis-
tration laws is People v. Durapau. Damon Durapau was charged with
sexual assault but found not guilty by reason of insanity.82 When Dura-
pau was charged, there was no requirement that the court order the De-
fendant to register as an offender.8 3 This changed with the addition of the
word "shall" to C.R.S. 16-8-118(2)(a) in 2005, which required the court
to order that Durapau register as a sex offender upon his release.8 4 Final-
ly, this court looked to the Supreme Court's analysis in Smith to deter-
mine if the 2005 amendment violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.5 The
court quoted the General Assembly, Smith, and the three cases discussed
above as evidence that he legislature intended the statute to be a nonpu-
nitive law geared toward public safety.86 The court then concluded that
the statute's amendment did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause without
any reference to its punitive effect.
In these cases, the Colorado courts' analyses have been incomplete
because they have failed to consider the punitive effect of retributive
registration requirements. These retroactive laws share common goals of
punishment: deterrence and retribution. Likewise, it is conceivable that
each state's registration procedures would historically have been consid-
ered punishment. Without considering these factors, the Colorado courts
leave this constitutional interpretation to speculation about the legisla-
ture's intent.
C. New Mexico's Interpretation
New Mexico's application of the Smith analysis can be summed up
under two landmark cases from the Court of Appeals of New Mexico:
State v. Druktenis88 and A CL U of New Mexico v. City of Albuquerque.8 9
New Mexico, unlike Colorado, eventually applied the Smith test's puni-
80. Id.
81. Id. at 277.
82. People v. Durapau, 280 P.3d 42, 45 (Colo. App. 2011).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 48.
86. Id. at 48-49.
87. Id. at 49.
88. 86 P.3d 1050 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004).
89. 137 P.3d 1215 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
[Vol. 92:3622
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tive intent and effect factors. The tone of the conclusions and opinions in
Druktenis, however, suggests the court may have felt conflicted about its
conclusion.
Druktenis was the first case to properly apply the Smith analysis in
New Mexico. Sean Druktenis pled guilty in 1998 to sex offenses that did
not require him to register with local authorities at the time.0 One year
later, New Mexico amended its law, the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA), to retroactively apply to Druktenis.9 1
Druktenis filed a motion to avoid applying for an exemption because it
was in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.92 The court laid out the
Smith and Mendoza-Martinez factors and applied the Supreme Court's
intent/effect test.93
The court of appeals first proclaimed that they "have no doubt that
our Legislature's intent in enacting SORNA was to enact a civil, remedi-
al, regulatory, nonpunitive law." 94 The court arrived at this conclusion by
making cursory statements about six of the seven Smith factors without
applying any facts to their analysis:
[T]hese conclusions are obvious: the provisions of SORNA do not
involve affirmative disability or restraint; have not historically been
regarded as punishment; do not come into play only on a finding of
scienter; only incidentally, if at all, promote traditional aims of retri-
bution and deterrence; and have a rationally connected, nonpunitive
purpose. In our view, that SORNA applies only to behavior that is al-
ready criminal is not a significant factor.95
The court then struggled with whether SORNA's requirements were ex-
cessive as they relate to the purpose of public safety.96 The court cited
E.B. v. Verniero97 and Russell v. Gregoire98 to show that offender regis-
tration has extreme consequences regarding employment and housing
*99opportunities.
After wading through the consequences of offender registration, the
court came to the final conclusion that "[v]irtually all federal circuits and
state jurisdictions considering this issue have rejected the argument that
retroactive application of sex offender statute registration and notifica-
90. Druktenis, 86 P.3d at 1054.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1055.
93. Id. at 1059-61.
94. Id. at 1060.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1060-62.
97. 119 F.3d 1077, 1102 (3d Cir. 1997) (describing the harsh realities of the consequences ex
offenders suffer with family, housing, and employment); see discussion infra Part III.A.
98. 124 F.3d 1079, 1092 (9th Cir. 1997) (conceding that registration requirements can have
serious consequences through "humiliation, public opprobrium, ostracism, and the loss of job oppor-
tunities").
99. Druktenis, 86 P.3d at 1061.
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tion requirements violates constitutional ex post facto prohibitions."00
The court seemed unwilling to disavow precedent despite reservations
about the potential injustice of retroactive application.
ACLU of New Mexico was a similar case brought by a civil rights
group challenging the constitutionality of New Mexico's SORNA.'o' The
various claims included violations of the Ex Post Facto Clause, double
jeopardy, and cruel and unusual punishment.102 The court did not exam-
ine the effect factors from Mendoza-Martinez. Rather, the court merely
concluded that because Smith and Druktenis found these laws to be non-
punitive, it would follow suit and find SORNA constitutional under all
claims.103 Like Colorado, New Mexico has yet to properly apply the con-
stitutionality of its Megan's Law under the Supreme Court's analysis.
Therefore, sex offenders are left with an unpredictable answer and no
protection from retroactive punishments.
D. Utah Application
The Utah Court of Appeals has not yet decided a case using the
Smith analysis. Even so, it is helpful to examine how the court has treat-
ed claims of unconstitutionality of Utah's Megan's Law. Utah's views
can be seen through a summary of its most recent case in this matter,
State v. Trotter.' Trotter remains Utah's guiding authority for this issue.
Kenneth Trotter pled guilty to having unlawful sexual conduct with
a minor.05 Later, he attempted to withdraw this plea because he was not
advised or informed that he would be required to register as a sex of-
fender. Because this is the closest case on the matter to reach the Utah
Supreme Court, it is clear that it has yet to hear an issue of ex post facto
concern. Even so, the court used Smith to conclude, "[T]he registration
requirement is intended to act not as a criminal punishment but as a
prophylactic civil remedy."'0 7 Like other states in the Tenth Circuit, the
Utah Supreme Court gave no analysis of whether the punitive effect of
the registration statute negates the legislature's intent to deem it civil.
E. Wyoming Application
Wyoming has only had opportunity to hear one case on the issue of
retroactive sex offender registration requirements. Kammerer v. State08
involved an offender with a second-degree sexual assault charge from
100. Druktenis, 86 P.3d at 1062.
101. ACLU ofN.M. v. City ofAlbuquerque, 137 P.3d 1215, 1220 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
102. Id. at 1221.
103. Id. at 1222.
104. 330 P.3d 1267 (Utah 2014).
105. Id at 1269.
106. Id
107. Id. at 1276. The court only used the Smith case in passing in a "see, e.g." citation.
108. 322 P.3d 827 (Wyo. 2014).
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1993 in New Jersey.'1 Ronald Kammerer subsequently moved to Wyo-
ming, and he was charged with failing to register in 2012.110 Kammerer
filed a motion to dismiss complaining that the registration laws were in
violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Like most state courts, the Su-
preme Court of Wyoming quickly determined that the legislature intend-
ed the registration requirements to be nonpunitive."' Despite this quick
conclusion, the court's opinion has a separate heading for "Punitive Ef-
fect" and gives a detailed analysis of the potentially punitive effects of
Wyoming's registration requirements, concluding that the law was non-
punitive. 112
Despite an analysis of the punitive effects, the Wyoming Supreme
Court's opinion remained overly conclusive. For example, when discuss-
ing the "traditional aims of punishment," the court provides no further
analysis than a direct quotation from the Smith opinion: "As in Smith, we
find that the classification of offenders based on their crimes is not indic-
ative of retributive intent."113 In analyzing the "historically regarded as
punishment" factor, the court deferred to the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals and concluded: "We are in agreement with the analysis of these
courts."'1 4 These conclusions would be acceptable only if identical stat-
utes were in question. No progress can be gained by merely agreeing to
another court's analysis when the law in question in those courts bares no
relation to the law currently at issue in each state.
II. OKLAHOMA APPLICATION
The Oklahoma application of the Smith analysis is the most detailed
and thoughtful of any Tenth Circuit state. This is illustrated in two Okla-
homa Supreme Court cases: Starkey v. Oklahoma Department of Correc-
tions and Luster v. State ex rel. Department of Corrections. Both cases
were split decisions, but they ultimately concluded that Oklahoma's Me-
gan's Law was excessive and unconstitutional as ex post facto punish-
ment. 5
A. Luster v. State ex rel. Department of Corrections
Christopher Luster pled guilty to sexual assault in April 1992 in
Texas. Luster then moved to Oklahoma and began registering with
Oklahoma authorities in 2003."' At that time, Oklahoma's Megan's Law
109. Id. at 830.
110. Id
111. Id at 834.
112. Id. at 834-39.
113. Id. at 837-38.
114. Id. at 834-36.
115. Starkey v. Okla. Dep't of Corr., 305 P.3d 1004, 1030 (Okla. 2013) 2013; Luster v. State
ex rel. Dep't of Corr., 315 P.3d 386, 391 (Okla. 2013).
116. Luster, 315 P.3d at 387.
117. Id.
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would have required Luster to register for ten years.'18 In 2007, Oklaho-
ma's Megan's Law was amended, requiring offenders like Luster to reg-
ister for life.1 19 In 2011, Luster petitioned the court and asked that he
either be taken off the registry or, alternatively, that he only be required
to register for the previously applicable ten years.1 20 This case was then
consolidated with several other plaintiffs who had filed similar actions.12 1
"Luster requested the court issue an order finding . . . each consolidated
plaintiff be required to register under the provisions of [SORNA] in ef-
fect at the time he or she pled guilty or was convicted ....
Eventually, the petition was granted and the Oklahoma Department
of Corrections appealed.12 3 In the interim, the Starkey case had been de-
cided.124 The court referred to Starkey saying that the requirements
"which were enacted after Starkey entered Oklahoma were to be applied
prospectively and not retroactively."'25 Interestingly, the same Justices,
Justice Winchester and Justice Taylor, dissented in both cases. In Lus-
ter, the dissent merely stated that they dissent for the same reasons each
dissented in Starkey.127 For this purpose, this Comment will focus on the
analysis given in Starkey as it applies in both cases.
B. Starkey v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections
James Starkey's sex offender registration period was increased ret-
roactively by a statute similar to those previously mentioned.128 Starkey
was charged with sexual assault upon a minor in Texas for an act that
occurred in 1997.129 Starkey moved to Oklahoma in 1998, and under the
law at the time should have only been required to register for ten years.130
This time was extended from an amendment to Oklahoma's Megan's
Law in 1998.131
One of the most prominent differences in Oklahoma's Megan's Law
from that of other states like Colorado is the existence of level designa-
tions, which create registration requirements dependent on the level of
118. Id.
119. Id
120. Id at 388.
121. Id at 387.
122. Id. at 389.
123. Id. at 388-89.
124. Id. at 390-91.
125. Id. at 390.
126. Id. at 391 (Winchester & Taylor, JJ., dissenting); Starkey v. Okla. Dep't of Corr., 305
P.3d 1004, 1032 (Okla. 2013) (Taylor & Winchester, JJ., dissenting).
127. Luster, 315 P.3d at 387 (Taylor, J., dissenting).
128. Starkey, 305 P.3d at 1008.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1009.
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future risk each offender poses to the public.1 32 The Supreme Court of
Oklahoma explained those designations as follows:
1. Level one (low): a designated range of points on the sex offender
screening tool indicating that the person poses a low danger to the
community and will not likely engage in criminal sexual conduct;
2. Level two (moderate): a designated range of points on the sex of-
fender screening tool indicating that the person poses a moderate
danger to the community and may continue to engage in criminal
sexual conduct; and
3. Level three (high): a designated range of points on the sex offender
screening tool indicating that the person poses a serious danger to the
community and will continue to engage in criminal sexual con-
duct.133
Level 3 offenders were required to register for life.1 3 4 One year before
Starkey's registration period would have expired, he was assigned a level
3 risk assessment and required to register for life.135 The trial court held
that the retroactive application of the law was unconstitutional, and the
Department of Corrections appealed the judgment.'36
The court first explained that he Ex Post Facto Clause was included
in the body of the U.S. Constitution adopted in 1787 rather than putting it
through the amendment process.137 The court contended that this sug-
gests the clause was "fundamental to the protection of individual liber-
ty."l38 Additionally, the court quoted Justice Marshall saying "the Ex
Post Facto Clause not only ensures that individuals have 'fair warning'
about the effect of criminal statutes, but also 'restricts governmental
power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation."'
1 39
The court then transitioned into a deep analysis of the Smith and Mendo-
za-Martinez factors, which they call the "intent-effects" test.140 The court
added, "How we apply the 'intent-effects' test is not governed by how
the federal courts have independently applied the same test under the
United States Constitution as long as our interpretation is at least as pro-
tective as the federal interpretation."1 41
132. Id. at 1010.
133. Id. (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 582.5(C)(1)-(3) (2014)).
134. Id. (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 583(C)D) (2014)).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1013.
137. Id. at 1018.
138. Id. at 1018-19.
139. Id. at 1019 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266-67 (1994)) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (examining Justice Stevens's analysis of the Ex Post Facto Clause, which
quotes Justice Marshall's opinion in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981)).
140. Id. at 1021.
141. Id.
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The court found that, like the Alaska version of Megan's Law in
Smith, the legislative purpose in enacting Oklahoma's SORNA was civil:
to identify sex offenders and alert the public when necessary.14 2 It then
went on to argue, "Although there is evidence pointing to a civil intent,
there is considerable evidence of a punitive effect." 43 Finally, a state
court realized the potential for the actual effect of these laws to be un-
constitutional. The court then proceeded to analyze the seven Mendoza-
Martinez factors to determine if there was enough proof to override the
legislative intent, which deemed the law civil in order to transform it into
a penalty.144
1. Affirmative Disability or Restraint
Unlike Alaska's version of SORNA, Oklahoma's SORNA requires
registrants to apply "in person."45 The court explained that the Smith
Court had emphasized the lack of an "in-person" requirement as the rea-
son Alaska's SORNA did not create an affirmative restraint.14 6 The court
also mentioned that Oklahoma has restrictions on where sex offenders
may live.147 In addition, Oklahoma sex offenders are required to renew
their license or identification every year when normal residents do so
every four years.148 Lastly, the court discussed the "profound humiliation
and community-wide ostracism" these afflicted registrants face, which
was acknowledged in the dissents of Smith and E.B. Verniero. 14 Thus,
the court found that SORNA "impose[d] substantial disabilities on regis-
trants."
2. Historically Regarded as a Punishment
Unlike Smith, the Oklahoma court looked to the historical practice
of public shaming to show registration was traditionally a punishment.'5 '
The court compared the branding of "Sex Offender" on each registrants
drivers license as their "scarlet letter" since they have to show this ID in
day-to-day transactions. 152 The court also discussed how the state's hous-
ing restrictions closely resembled the community ousting that was tradi-
tionally practiced upon sexual offenders.153 In sum, the court found that





147. Id at 1023 (providing the many housing restraints on sex offenders in Oklahoma).
148. Id
149. Id. at 1024 (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 115 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting))
(internal quotation mark omitted); see also E.B. v. Vemiero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1102 (3d Cir. 1997).
150. Starkey, 305 P.3d at 1025.
151. Id.
152. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
153. Id. at 1026 (concluding that housing restrictions are "regarded in our history and traditions
as punishment" (quoting Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 444 (Ky. 2009)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)).
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these consequences were "at least analogous . . . . to the traditional pun-
ishment of banishment."'54
3. Comes Into Play Only on a Finding of Scienter
Some SORNA crimes, like statutory rape, do not require a finding
of scienter.'55 This is because "it is not a defense that a defendant did not
know the victim was under the age of consent." 5 6 Even so, because
courts have considered this to be little proof of punitive effect, the Okla-
homa Supreme Court, like in Smith, found that this factor "should be
given little weight in our analysis."57
4. Traditional Aims of Punishment: Retribution and Deterrence
Here, the court again discussed how humiliation and housing re-
strictions assist in deterrence.'58 The court additionally explained that the
registration times are based on the statute the offender was convicted of
rather than their individual risk of recidivism.15 9 The court maintained
that this designation is retributive in nature, focusing on past actions ra-
ther than future risk, which supported the conclusion that SORNA has a
punitive effect.160
5. The Behavior is Already a Crime
Like Smith, the Oklahoma court struggled with the awkward appli-
cation of this factor because SORNA is only triggered when a crime is
committed.161 However, this is exactly the punitive characteristic the
factor was created to prevent, and the court rightly concluded: "[T]he
fact that [SORNA] applies only to behavior that is already a crime sup-
ports the conclusion this ... factor has a punitive effect." 62
6. Rational Connection to a Nonpunitive Purpose
Concededly, there is an obvious nonpunitive purpose behind sex of-
fender registration, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court admitted this.'63
The goal of identifying dangerous sexual predators and alerting the pub-
lic to avoid dangers of recidivism advances the civil purpose of public
154. Id.
155. Id
156. Id at 1026-27.
157. Id. at 1027.
158. Id.
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safety.'1 While this factor weighed in favor of constitutionality, the five
factors favoring a punitive effect persuaded the court.165
7. Excessiveness
The court admitted yet again the importance of protecting the public
from the risk of recidivism.166 Even so, "[t]his non-punitive objective,
while undeniably important, will not serve to render a statute so broad
and sweeping as to be non-punitive."l67 The court described how, with-
out any individual determination of Starkey's danger to the community,
he was required to remain on the registry for life.168 This was done leav-
ing no chance of petitioning to be removed from the registry, a life sen-
tence, no matter how rehabilitated Starkey may become.169 The court
then concluded with Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Smith, "What ultimate-
ly tips the balance for me is the Act's excessiveness in relation to its
nonpunitive purpose. . . . The Act applies to all convicted sex offenders,
without regard to their future dangerousness." In sum, the court found
that this factor suggests the law has a punitive effect.171
The court concluded that "there is clear proof that the effect of the
retroactive application of [SORNA's] registration is punitive and out-
weighs its non-punitive purpose." 72 The court did not attempt to say that
all sex offender registry laws were unconstitutional, but it limited its
finding to retroactive applications of these Megan's Laws in unfairly
humiliating and ousting past offenders.173
C. Dissenting Opinions
Justice Taylor wrote a dissenting opinion in Starkey suggesting that
registration is merely "one of the many, many unpleasant lifetime civil
consequences of being convicted of a felony."1 74 What he failed to con-
sider is that none of those other felonies require offender registration.
Therefore, it is different in practice and effect and should be analyzed
differently.
Justice Winchester then gave a detailed overview of his agreement
with the Smith case in a dissenting opinion.75 He explained that registra-
tion could not be historically regarded as punishment because it is of
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1030.
166. Id. at 1028.
167. Id. at 1028-29.
168. Id. at 1029.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1029-30 (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 116-17 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
171. Id. at 1030.
172. Id.
173. See id
174. Id at 1032 (Taylor, J., dissenting).
175. Id (Winchester, J., dissenting).
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recent origin.176 Still, the majority clearly explained that registration
closely resembles the "scarlet letter" punishments in the seventeenth
century.177 Justice Winchester further argued that there is no affirmative
disability or restraint because a routine background check would provide
the same information as the registry.' Even so, the additional effects of
the registry were explained by the majority saying, "Anyone at any time
and for any reason can find the address and picture of a registered sdx
offender along with the statute under which the offender was convict-
ed . . . ."179 Does this fit the bill of a routine background check, or is the
registry a new common place for future homeowners to gossip over their
potential neighbors?
Justice Winchester admitted that offender registration promotes the
traditional aims of punishment, but like the Smith Court explained, this
factor alone does not make a statute punitive.80 Justice Winchester
agreed with Smith that a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose is
one of the most significant factors.'8 ' The majority admits that this factor
weighs in favor of a non-punitive effect; however, the Justices explain
that this is not dispositive of the issue.'82 Lastly, Justice Winchester de-
scribes the Supreme Court's analysis of excessiveness in relation to a
non-punitive purpose providing that the state can regulate convicted sex
offenders as a class without individual determinations of dangerous-
ness. 1 The majority explains, in an effort to show the constitution pro-
tects individuals, that an individual determination is necessary to allow
non-dangerous individuals their constitutional protections. '8 While Jus-
tice Winchester's arguments were rebutted by the majority opinion, it is
notable that he gave victims of this status the just opportunity of a thor-
ough analysis under Smith. The Starkey opinion, and the dissenting and
concurring Justices in the Smith case, suggests that when this level of
analysis is performed, it may result in a closer case than presented by
other state courts in the Tenth Circuit.
III. A PROPOSAL FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
The intent of this Part is to persuade the Tenth Circuit states that
now is the time to provide predictability in the law. There will be no
shortage of opportunities to hear these issues as the registry continues to
176. Id. at 1034.
177. Id. at 1025 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
178. Id. at 1035 (Winchester, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 1024 (majority opinion).
180. Id. at 1035 (Winchester, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 1036.
182. Id. at 1028 (majority opinion).
183. Id. at 1036 (Winchester, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 1028-29 (majority opinion).
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grow.185 Subpart A provides a detailed analysis of the awful consequenc-
es that draconian registration requirements have placed upon their vic-
tims. Subpart B describes the importance of predictability in the law.
Last, Subpart C is a call to action for the states of the Tenth Circuit to
provide victims of retroactive offender registry a constitutionally proper
analysis of ex post facto laws.
A. Severe Consequences: Housing and Employment
Wendy Whitaker engaged in oral sex with a fifteen-year-old when
she was seventeen.186 Ten years after her sodomy conviction, she was
forced out of her home because it was too close to a child daycare cen-
ter. Even though she owned her home, a church nearby happened to
have a child care system, and she was forced to leave within seventy-two
hours.'" Housing restrictions are a very serious penalty inflicted upon
sex offenders who are forced to register. For example, the New York
Times explains that defense lawyers have put together maps of Manhat-
tan to show that nearly the whole city is off limits to sex offenders.'89
Many of these offenders seek accommodation in homeless shelters be-
cause they are unable to find adequate housing.190 Unfortunately, even
homeless shelters have been unable to receive sex offenders because of
their proximity to childcare.191 Many offenders end up as transients or
living in encampments of trailers.'92 Carlos Bonilla, a sixty-five year old
who has already completed his sentence, like many others in New York,
has been kept in the custody of the corrections department because all
potential housing arrangements would be in violation of statutory hous-
ing restrictions.'93
Colorado likewise explained the issue with sex offenders and home-
lessness in a statement in the Denver Post.19 4 "Rob McCallum, spokes-
man for the Colorado Judicial Branch, says probation first tries to find
housing in the county where the defendant is sentenced, but it is not al-
ways possible considering that housing for sex offenders is difficult to
185. See Gary Taylor, Number ofSex Offenders Soars-Experts Unsure ofReasons, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Feb. 7, 2012, at Al ("The numbers are growing across the nation .... [T]he U.S. has
seen a 23 percent overall increase in the number of registered sex offenders . . . .").
186. Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, Preventing Sex-Offender Recidivism Through
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approaches and Specialized Community Integration, 22 TEMP. POL. &
Civ. RTS. L. REV. 1, 25 (2012).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Joseph Goldstein, Housing Rules Keep Sex Offenders in Prison Beyond Release Dates,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2014, at A18.
190. Id.




194. Felisa Cardona, Supervising Sex Offenders: Array of Rules Tests Officials: An Adams on
Denver Streets Offers an Example of Challenges Faced by Authorities, DENVER POST, Nov. 20,
2011, at B-09.
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find." 95 The question then arises: is it difficult, or is it impossible? The
article continues by saying that registration doesn't accomplish its goal
of protecting the public because the "people don't know if [homeless]
sex offenders are truly living in the city where they register." 96
Another Colorado reporter described a recent court order invalidat-
ing a 2006 ordinance passed by the city of Englewood, Colorado, re-
stricting living arrangements for sex offenders.'9 7 "The order states that
restrictive 'not in my backyard ordinances' can have a domino effect,
eventually forbidding any sex offenders from living anywhere in Colora-
do." 98 The restriction kept Colorado sex offenders from living within
2,000 feet of any public school or park and within 1,000 feet of any day-
care center.199 Stephen Ryals, a Colorado resident and registered sex of-
fender, and his wife bought a house in Englewood, CO, and were later
told Stephen did not have the right to live there.200 Is this really the civil
remedy these past cases were suggesting?
Several southern states have also shown an increase in homeless-
ness of sex offenders. "In 2009, nine homeless sex offenders, who had
been ordered to live in the woods near an Atlanta office park after they
could not find housing, were then forced to try to find somewhere else to
live." 20 ' A makeshift camp in Miami houses as many as seventy of these
offenders.202 Additionally, some distance markers restricting residency
500 to 2,500 feet from schools "can effectively zone out sex offend-
ers."203 What's worse, studies how that there is "no correlation" between
these restrictions and lowered recidivism.204 Rather, these infected indi-
viduals are left without any chance of rehabilitation.205
In New Mexico, reporters explain that "changes will tighten regis-
tration requirements and close a loophole for out-of-state sex offend-
ers. . . . [S]ome sex offenders registered in another state did not have to
register upon moving to New Mexico."206 One reporter quoted Regina
Chacon of the State Department of Public Safety who said she under-
stands the conflicting feelings about retroactive laws, "You have some-
195. Id.
196. Id




201. Brian Griggs, Note, Homeless Is Not an Address: States Need to Explore Housing Options
for Sex Offenders, 79 UMKC L. REV. 757, 767 (2011).
202. Id. at 767-68 (joking that this community may soon need its own governor).
203. Cassie Dallas, Comment, Not in My Backyard: The Implications of Sex Offender Residen-
cy Ordinances in Texas and Beyond, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1235, 1246 (2009).
204. Id at 1245-46 (citing a Colorado and a Minnesota study showing that there is "no correla-
tion between residential proximity to schools or parks and sex offender recidivism").
205. See id. at 1244 ("[R]esidency restrictions limit the ability of offenders to reintegrate into
society.").
206. NM Tightens Sex Offender Registration Laws, ALBUQUERQUE J. (June 28, 2013, 7:11
AM), http://www.abqjoumal.corn/215689/news/nm-tightens-sex-offender-registration-laws.htmi.
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one who committed a sex crime 30-some years ago and hasn't been in
trouble since. Is that fair, to register them now?"2 07 Chacon went on,
however, to put this off as a collateral consequence of a useful tool. 208
In 2012, a Utah reporter discussed the State's willingness to allow a
sex offender to escape the ill effects of registration.20 9 The article quotes
Representative Jack Draxler saying, "I am trying to bring some oppor-
tunity for redemption from someone who's really paid the price and tried
to get their life back in order."210 IS the jail sentence and corresponding
probation time not paying the price enough? Another Utah reporter de-
scribed the lack of a housing requirement in 2006.211 He quotes Jeremy
Shaw, a supervisor from the Department of Corrections, explaining that
"an offender's residence proximity to places where children congregate
has no correlation to reoffending. . . . A person can't live next to a
school, but a pedophile can go stand in front of a school."212 The difficul-
ty in finding adequate housing has changed drastically "from 2003 when
the Smith v. Doe Court commented, 'The Act does not restrain activities
sex offenders may pursue but leaves them free to change jobs or resi-
dences."'
2 13
Lack of housing is not the only negative effect from registration.
Many sex offenders also suffer from a lack of employment opportuni-
214ties2. 9News in Colorado followed a story of an anonymous sex offend-
215
er they called Brent. Brent was a highly paid employee of Lockheed
Martin when an undercover police officer contacted him pretending to be
a thirteen-year-old and thereafter arrested him for "criminal intent of
sexual assault."2 16 Brent was fired from Lockheed after he was arrest-
207. Julia M. Dendinger, New Mexico Explains Sex Offender Registration Guidelines,
BACKGROUND INVESTIGATOR (Feb. 2009),
http://icioffshore.com/news/fulltext/News.asp?FTID=963&Title=New%2OMexico%20Explains%20
Sex%200ffender%20Registration%20Guidelines (internal quotation marks omitted).
208. See id.
209. Ladd Brubaker, Bill Allowing Some Sex Offender Off Register Early Approved, DESERET
NEWS (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700218666/Bill-allowing-some-sex-
offender-off-register-early-approved.htm1.
210. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
211. Alan Choate, Housing Restrictions for Sex Offenders, DAILY HERALD (Sept. 20, 2006),
http://www.heraldextra.com/news/local/housing-restrictions-for-sex-offenders/article dd2ba95-
b6f9-53d9-8926-998b69d296ce.html.
212. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Jeremy Shaw, a supervisor in the Utah Department of
Corrections adult probation and parole division) (internal quotation mark omitted).
213. Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of Unconstitutionality in Sex
Offender Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071, 1115 (2012) ("Changing jobs or relocating
residences at will is no longer an option under super-registration schemes.").
214. Jacob Frumkin, Note and Comment, Perennial Punishment? Why the Sex Offender Regis-
tration and Notification Act Needs Reconsideration, 17 J.L. & POL'Y 313, 321 (2008) (considering
the Catch-22 of requiring registration of employment and housing when it is "difficult, if not impos-
sible, for sex offenders to find a home or an employer.").
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ed.217 The article explains, "Employers wouldn't consider Brent, neigh-
bors turned on him and bills piled up." 2 18 It goes on to explain that
Brent's actual sentence "pales in comparison to the personal sentence he
deals with every day."2 19 This sentence isn't imposed on any other crimi-
nals: not murderers, not thieves, and not domestic abusers.
In Utah, a reporter for the Deseret News quoted a defense attorney
describing registration as "the modern-day scarlet letter." 220 The reporter
added that it inhibits past offenders from trying to assimilate into society
as it "hinders their ability to find housing and jobs."22 1 Indeed, the article
concludes that the excessive requirements "force offenders to go under-
ground."222 An Oklahoma news station describes the enormous relief felt
by a past offender when he was told he would no longer have to regis-
223ter. The report called the man Dave, and explained that he slept with a
fourteen-year-old girl he thought was seventeen when he was also seven-
teen.224 Dave served diligently on the registry for nineteen years, he lived
with his mother upon release from prison because of housing restrictions,
and he struggled to find a good job.225 Dave also "has never been able to
take his kids to the park or attend their activities at school."226 When
Dave started his time on the registry, he was told he would have to be
registered for ten years, but in year seven he received a letter saying he
227would have to register for life. Dave cried with joy when Oklahoma
laws were amended and he learned he would be freed from his scarlet
letter.
228
The consequences facing these "habitual offenders" far exceed the
civil, nonpunitive purpose the courts say these laws serve. Each offender
deserves an opportunity to be assessed for individual danger of recidi-
vism before enduring these penalties. Likewise, each offender has a right
to live free of the undying fear that they may be retroactively restrained




220. Dennis Romboy & Lucinda Dillon Kinkead, Does Sex Offender Registry Really Work?
DESERET NEWS (Mar. 19, 2008, 12:22 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/695262647/Does-
sex-offender-registry-really-work.htmi (internal quotation mark omitted).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Lori Fullbright, Oklahoma Removes 2,400 Registered Sex Offenders After Supreme Court








B. Predictability in the Law
"If individuals can predict what the law will require of them, then,
in principle, they are on notice and have the opportunity to conform their
behavior to the law's demands."2 29 Individual sex offenders are discour-
aged from attempting rehabilitation if at any point in the process they
could be required to remove themselves from safe housing and comfort-
able jobs as a class. "Individuals need to know how the law governs their
behavior so that they can conform their behavior to the law." 2 30 In order
to provide an incentive for offenders to obtain counseling, avoid recidi-
vism, and assimilate back into society, they must be given a predictable
alternative to pursue.
Thomas Lundmark, Professor of Law at the University of Munster,
Germany, writes that predictability may be in direct opposition to indi-
vidual liberty.2 31 He explains, "Opponents of predictability would say
that it comes at the cost of individual justice."2 32 The critics' problem
with predictability is that unbending law applies commonly to all regard-
less of individual guilt. However, sex offenders suffer the opposite di-
lemma in retroactively applied registration regimes. After serving a sen-
tence properly applied by a court of the United States, the unpredictabil-
ity of registry laws leaves offenders in lifelong fear of a prolonged sen-
tence.233 The state can increase registration periods, create new housing
restrictions, and impose more harsh employment limitations. Applying
laws in a predictable manner need not be rigid. The courts can provide a
predictable method of analysis that can be applied individually to avoid
the cost of giving up individual justice.
"Among the many values that [the law] can secure, none is more
important than legal certainty. . . 234 Predictability allows offenders to
"know where they stand . . . free to plan and lead their lives as they
please . . . [w]ithin the confines of their established duties to others."235
The ability for individuals in society to know where they stand and what
they can do while avoiding government intervention is "a signal virtue of
civilized societies."236 Therefore, the only way to create a fair and just
229. Lawrence B. Solum, Indeterminacy, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 479, 487 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2d ed. 2010) (quoting Jules L. Coleman & Brian
Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, andAuthority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 582 (1993)) (internal quota-
tion mark omitted).
230. FRUEHWALD, supra note 17, at 52.
231. THOMAS LUNDMARK, CHARTING THE DIVIDE BETWEEN COMMON AND CIVIL LAW 122
(2012).
232. Id.
233. See supra Part III.A.
234. NEIL MACCORMICK, RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW: A THEORY OF LEGAL
REASONING 16 (2005).
235. THOMAS SCHULTZ, TRANSNATIONAL LEGALITY: STATELESS LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 20 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting MATTHEW H. KRAMER, IN DEFENSE OF
LEGAL POSITIVISM: LAW WITHOUT TRIMMINGS 41 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
236. MACCORMICK, supra note 234, at 12.
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rule of law is to provide predictability and security and stand by it. Most
importantly, "[i]n order for governmental actions and judicial decisions
to be predictable so as to enable citizens to plan and lead their lives in
accordance with the law, the law must be prospective. It must not impose
a posteriori or ex post facto legal consequences."237 Society teaches this
value early on: we cannot change the rules in the middle of a game. The
Government's ability to change the law to retroactively apply to sex of-
fenders who have successfully assimilated back into normal life is pre-
cisely the unpredictability that these authors and theorists have criticized.
While flexibility in the law may be important, "the more flexibility we
permit, the less predictability we enjoy." 2 38
C. A Call to Action in the Tenth Circuit
The purpose of judicial review is "to take vague constitutional gen-
eralities and give them a specific content appropriate to the times and
circumstances by balancing the different considerations of social welfare
involved." 2 39 The goal of the judiciary is to interpret the laws. "The goal
of interpretation is to achieve the social goal of law."240 It is not this
Comment's purpose to persuade the Tenth Circuit that sex offender reg-
istries are per se unconstitutional. Rather, its purpose is to persuade the
Tenth Circuit states that it is a closer call than can be determined through
seven unsubstantiated and cursory conclusions.241 Specifically, this
comment asks courts to apply the Smith factors in a substantive analyti-
cal method that accounts for the realities of the lives of registered sex
offenders. The effect of each state's Megan's Law must be given its in-
dividual and substantive constitutional analysis to determine if its actual
retroactive effect is overtly punitive. The Oklahoma Supreme Court's
analysis may not hold true for all states' statutory schemes, but it certain-
ly showed the level of analysis that should occur. The negative conse-
quences described above suggest it is time to balance the considerations
of social welfare with the constitutional rights of sex offenders that me
be violated by each Tenth Circuit state's SORNA laws.
The most important social concern voiced by the courts in the Tenth
242
Circuit is public safety. The concern is that sex offenders are more
likely than other criminals to commit similar crimes: the fear of recidi-
vism. This fear, however, is unwarranted.243 First, these statistics are run
237. Luc B. TREMBLAY, THE RULE OF LAW, JUSTICE, AND INTERPRETATION 150 (1997).
238. JEFFREY F. BEATTY & SUSAN S. SAMUELSON, ESSENTIALS OF BUSINESS LAW 78 (2d ed.
2005).
239. CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW 276 (Rev. ed. 1994).
240. AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW, at xv (Sari Bashi, trans., 2005).
241. See supra Part I.C (discussing New Mexico's fact-empty conclusions in analyzing the
punitive effect of its SORNA laws).
242. See, e.g., Starkey v. Okla. Dep't of Corr., 305 P.3d 1004, 1028-30 (Okla. 2013).
243. See CBI Sex Offender Registry Facts, COLO. BUREAU INVESTIGATION,
https://www.colorado.gov/apps/cdps/sor/faq.jsf (last visited Nov. 9, 2014) (stating that most sex
offenders have no documented criminal history); see also Sex and Kidnap Offender Notif ication and
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with sex offenders as a class without accounting for what specific crime
was committed or what individual level of risk the offender poses to so-
244
ciety. One study of sex offenders shows "that while 36.2% of the sex-
ual offenders generally recidivated, only 13.7% sexually recidivated and
14.3% violently recidivated."24 5 Another study found that other crimes
had significantly higher recidivism rates, as rapists were rearrested for
general recidivism (within three years) at a much lower rate (46%) than
those convicted of burglary (76%), robbery (70.2%), and drug offenses
(66.7%).246 Yet none of these other crimes require offenders to register.
While public safety is a valid nonpunitive purpose, the only way to justi-
fy its registration requirement is to apply it to all criminal activity as all
recidivate. Still, some sex offenders pose more of a threat of recidivism
than others. This leads to the next suggestion: a detailed level designa-
tion, like Oklahoma's system, to give some separation between violent
and habitual offenders, and one-time offenders who can be rehabilitated.
Oklahoma divides its offenders into three categories: low, moderate,
and high risk.24 7 These levels are not based solely on the crime commit-
ted, but rather on the individual risk each offender poses to the communi-
ty. 248 The length of time that a person is required to remain on the regis-
try increases according to individual risk of recidivism.249 This system
addresses Justice Ginsburg's worries in the Smith dissent that SORNA
applies to offenders without an individualized determination of their fu-
ture dangerousness.250 Rather, each individual would be designated a
level according to several factors: the crime committed, the number and
seriousness of past offenses, and the mental state of the defendant. Addi-
tionally, offenders who have proven they can assimilate back into society
should be allowed a chance to petition to lower their level designation
after some specified period of time.251
Compare this to the Colorado Bureau of Investigation, which sets
the duration of its registry requirements according to the statute violat-
252ed. For example, a Class 1, 2, or 3 felony requires twenty years of reg-
Registration, UTAH DEP'T CORR.,
http://www.communitynotification.com/cap_office disclaimer.php?office=54438 (last visited Nov.
9, 2014) (explaining that being on the registry list "does not imply listed individuals will commit a
specific type of crime in the future").
244. See Eagan, supra note 66, at 267-68.
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RECIDIVISM 54 (2012).
246. See id at 53-81.
247. See Starkey, 305 P.3d at 1010.
248. See id
249. Id.
250. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 116-17 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
251. See Starkey, 305 P.3d at 1010 (Starkey made an attempt to decrease his level 3 designa-
tion to a level 1 upon completion of his sentence).
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istration, and a Class 4, 5, or 6 felony requires ten years of registration.253
Colorado does not automatically remove offenders from the list, but re-
quires them to petition to discontinue registration.254 Each offender lives
in fear that the legislature may increase this sentence as it sees fit. Is this
predictability in the rule of law, or does it more closely resemble the ex
post facto concerns that the founding fathers had in mind?
As in Colorado, Utah sets the registration time period according to
the crime committed.255 For instance: kidnapping, incest, and forcible
sexual abuse require ten years; child kidnapping, rape, and aggravated
sexual assault require registration for life.256 This is done without any
determination of individual risk of recidivism. The Utah DOC website
admits that many of these time periods will extend beyond the supervi-
sion legally allowed to the Utah Department of Corrections.2 57
"Once a convict, always a convict" does not comply with the Ex
Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. The Tenth Circuit
states can and should take the time to at least give proper scrutiny to the-
se issues. It is fundamentally unfair to enact a civil registration regime
that has punitive effects but is not subject to the same constitutional safe-
guards as other punitive laws. As such, the Tenth Circuit states must not
remain silent on this issue. It is the duty of the courts, with a special re-
sponsibility for the quality of justice, to ensure that the legislature does
not unconstitutionally deny its citizens their individual liberty.
CONCLUSION
The Ex Post Facto Clause was written with individual liberty as its
fundamental purpose.258 It was designed to protect the country's citizens
from unfair and excessive punishment applied retroactively. Modern sex
offender registry requirements applied retroactively cannot be justified as
constitutional merely because of the legislature's perceived intent. Even
if the legislature did intend for registration to be civil and nonpunitive,
the effect of each state's Megan's Law is at least potentially punitive in
effect. Therefore, refusing to give these laws a proper analysis as laid out
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Utah Laws Regulating Registered Sex Offenders, UTAH DEP'T CORR.,
http://corrections.utah.gov/index.php?option=com content&view=article&id=1062:utah-laws-
regulating-registered-sex-offenders&catid=26:sex-offender-registry&Itemid=191 (last visited Nov.
9,2014).
256. Id.
257. Frequently Asked Questions, UTAH DEP'T CORR.,
http://corrections.utah.gov/index.php?option=com content&view=article&id=888:faqs&catid=2:unc
ategorised&Itemid=1 19 (last visited Nov. 9, 2014) (accessed by searching for "registry FAQ" on the
Utah DOC website).
258. State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 13-14 (Me. 2009) (explaining that the Ex Post Facto Clause
was "included in the original Constitution and [was] intended by the framers of the Constitution to
protect individual liberty").
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by the Supreme Court in Smith is a contravention of the courts' duties
under the common law.
This Comment is not meant to suggest that Oklahoma was correct in
its final conclusion that Oklahoma SORNA laws were punitive in effect.
Instead, this Comment suggests that the Oklahoma Supreme Court must
be applauded for its detailed and just application of the Smith in-
tent/effects test. The Tenth Circuit state courts can and should follow suit
by giving each SORNA law a fair analysis to determine if denying the
individual rights of these offenders is truly nonpunitive in effect. If the
laws are upheld, each state must consider the social implications and
lessen the punitive effect of these laws through fair level designations.
"The stigma gone, Hester heaved a long, deep sigh, in which the
burden of shame and anguish departed from her spirit. 0 exquisite relief.
She had not known the weight, until she felt the freedom!"2 59 May those
that have offended be given a chance at redemption and an opportunity to
feel this peace.
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